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ABSTRACT

This document contains the concluding chapters of the final report on the Project on Social Architecture in Education. Chapter 10 reviews the case studies and begins with some comments on the question of implementation success, both ultimate and intermediate. The discussion then moves to each of the six basic primary tasks--political stabilization, knowledge utilization, vision development, social-architectural design, actualization, and institutionalization--assessing how the tasks were, in general, approached. The chapter concludes with some discussion of the planning/implementation group capabilities that seemed critical for success. Chapter 11 offers some possible lessons that may be useful for several different audiences: those planning and implementing new schools; those supplying funds for such efforts; those aiding or facilitating such efforts; and students and researchers of the educational change process. (Author/MLF)

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EA 011 522

Final Report

Part IV: Conclusions

Chapter 10

REFELECTIONS ON THE CASE STUDIES

Chapter 11

IMPLICATIONS AND ADVICE

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From the Final Report to National Institute of Education, Grant NIE-G-74-0051. Designing and Starting Innovative Schools: a Field Study of Social Architecture in Education. Matthew B. Miles, Principal Investigator.

December, 1978

Introductory Note

This volume is a portion of the Final Report, Grant NIE-G-74-0051, "Designing and Starting Innovative Schools: a Field Study of Social Architecture in Education," Matthew B. Miles, Principal Investigator.

The Final Report contains the following parts:

Part I: Introduction

1. Executive Summary
2. New Schools as a Strategy for Educational Improvement
3. Planning and Implementing New Schools: a General Framework

Part II: Research Methods

4. Project Overview
5. Research Methods
   Appendices

Part III: Case Studies

6. Westgate Schools: a case study of two open-space elementary schools
7. Change and Conflict: educational innovation in community context
8. Innovation in Lakeport
   College High School: a planning case study
   The Founding of Julius Appelbaum High School
9. Arts Co-op: an experimental high school program

Part IV: Conclusions

10. Reflections on the Case Studies
11. Implications and Advice

Part V: Mapping New Schools: a series of new-school planning guides

1. Setting the stage for planning
2. Designing your school
3. Mapping your school's environment
4. Making your school work

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Chapter 10

REFLECTIONS ON THE CASE STUDIES

Matthew B. Miles, Sam D. Sieber, David E. Wilder and Barry A. Gold

What sorts of generalizations can be made as we examine the case studies in Part III? In this chapter we reflect on what seems noticeable and potentially fruitful. Given the range of schools and communities we were considering, it is probably not wise to engage in extended cross-site analysis. Rather, the intent is to surface themes and issues that are most salient, and to muse on their meaning. The chapter, in this view, cannot test hypotheses, but it may suggest plausible and interesting ones that are congruent with what we have seen, and could be tested in other new-school settings.

We should note that there are some useful internal comparisons that can be made in our data. For example, we had three open-space elementary schools, existing in two rather different community settings (Lincoln Acres and Westgate). And within Westgate itself, the way School 2 and 3 were implemented, supposedly with the same initial vision, differed a good deal. Finally, we had two high schools being planned within the same general urban school district (Lakeport), both subject to similar constraints. We shall try to exploit these comparative possibilities where we can.

This chapter, like the case studies, utilizes the general framework laid out in Chapter 3. We begin with some comments on the question of implementation success, both ultimate and intermediate. Then we move in turn to each of the six basic primary tasks: political stabilization, knowledge utilization, vision development, social-architectural design, actualization, and institutionalization, assessing how the tasks (and their associated dilemmas) were, in general approached, and offering commentary. We conclude with some discussion of the planning/ implementation group capabilities that seemed critical for success.

We do not intend to be exhaustive, but reflective and stimulative. If the reader is moved to similar reflection and can generate other interesting propositions, our purpose will have been achieved. The analysis and commentary sections of the case studies are clearly marked off to enable easy cross-site comparison.

Implementation Success

"Ultimate" Success

How successful were our schools? We used four basic criteria to judge implementation success: whether the school as actualized resembled the core hopes of its planners to a reasonable degree; whether the inevitably-occurring problems of the school were coped with effectively; whether various stakeholders (parents, students, staff, and external administrators) were satisfied; and whether student learning and achievement were occurring.

Table 1 sorts out the six schools according to our four criteria of successful implementation. We have differentiated each school by various stages of implementation. College High School is not included because it never opened for students.

Table 1

IMPLEMENTATION SUCCESS BY CRITERIA AND STAGES

		Goal-congruence	Problem-coping	Stakeholder satisfaction				Student learning, achievement*
				Parent	Student	Staff	Ext. Admin	
Westgate #2	4 mos.	L	M	M	M	L+	M-	--
	1st year	M+	M+	M	M+	H-	M+	M+
	2d year	M-	M	M	M+	M	M-	M?
Westgate #3	4 mos.	L	M	M	M	L+	M	--
	1st year	L+	M+	M+	M+	M+	M	M
	2d year	M-	M	M	M+	M+	M-	M?
Lincoln Acres	4 mos.	L+	L	M-	M+	L	L+	--
	1st year	L+	M	M+	M+	M-	M	M+
	2d year	M	H	H	M+	H	H	M+?
Appelbaum	4 mos.	L	M	H	M+	M	H?	--
	1st year	L+	M	H	M+	M	H	M+?
	2d year	M-	M+	H	H-	M-	H	M+?
Arts Coop	1st 5 mos.	H	M-	H	H	M-	H/L#	H
	2d year	H	H	H	H	M+	M	H

H=High M=Moderate L=Low
--not assessed

*H,M,L in comparison to schools with similar population and setting

#Sending school districts were satisfied, but the parent agency head was not.

What can we infer from Table 1? Looking at the four criteria and scanning vertically, we note several things. First, the degree of goal-congruent implementation tended to improve the longer the school was operating--except for Arts Coop, where it was high to begin with. But the other four schools all achieved only moderate success on this criterion, at best.

Second, problem-coping showed less clear improvement over time (except for Lincoln Acres), and tended to be moderate to good.

Third, stakeholder satisfaction varies according to category. Parents and students had moderate to high satisfaction throughout implementation stages (even in conflictful Lincoln Acres, after 4 months nearly all parents felt moderately good about the school). That these two prime classes of stakeholder felt good bodes well. External administrators were also generally satisfied, with two notable exceptions: Lincoln Acres required radical external intervention from the superintendent early in its life, then gradually proved more satisfying; and Arts Coop faced a serious problem in the negative attitudes of its sponsoring agency head. Perhaps the most interesting thing is that teacher satisfaction was the most mercurial of our satisfaction indicators--especially in Westgate and Lincoln Acres. Teachers' feelings went up and down with the stresses of implementation.

Finally, though (except for Arts coop) our student data are thin, our best guess is that student outputs were at least as good (and perhaps better) than those from comparable schools. We saw no indication that performance was poorer. And in Arts Coop goal-related learning was clearly high, as noted in field work, teacher data, and questionnaire responses from students.

The question of relative degree of implementation success is a difficult one, because much depends on the weighting of the four criteria. If we give strongest weight to goal-congruence, the picture is quite clear: Arts Coop is strongest, with the other four trailing: much of their innovative vision was lost. If we add in problem-coping ability and stakeholder satisfaction, it seems likely that Arts Coop still stands out, followed by Lincoln Acres, then Appelbaum, then the two Westgate schools. Student learning does little to discriminate the schools, other than giving Arts Coop the edge.

What might account for these differences? Explanations have been offered in Part III on a case-by-case basis: from a comparative point of view we might explore the idea that the quality of "intermediate" outcomes during the planning period prior to school opening may have accounted for the variation in implementation success.

Intermediate Outcomes

To review: we specified certain outcomes of planning as most salient:

the financial resources obtained to support the school; the endorsement (approval) of significant portions of the school's environment; the quality of planning/implementation decisions; and the ownership (acceptance) of such decisions.

Table 2 reviews the "intermediate outcomes" noted during the planning period for each school in the case studies.

Table 2

INTERMEDIATE OUTCOMES (PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION)

	Financial resources	Endorsement	Decision Quality	Decision ownership
Westgate #2	+	+?	+	+?
Westgate #3	+	+?	+	+?
Lincoln Acres	+	+,-*	-?	?
College High	?	?-	-	-
Appelbaum	+	+	?	+
Arts Coop	+?	+	+?	+,?**

+=Adequate ?=Uncertain -=Inadequate

*Strong in school and district; inadequate in community.

**Strong during early planning, uncertain during later planning.

Several generalizations can be made. First, for most schools, dollars were not an issue; money was uncertain only for College High, with some tightness for Arts Coop. Second, most of the schools were reasonably successful in gaining stakeholder endorsement. Arts Coop worked hard for it, and Appelbaum's planners did too; in Westgate the issue was mostly taken for granted. Only two schools fell down badly: Lincoln Acres completed planning with many alienated community members; for College High School endorsement was uncertain to lacking.

Decision quality was best in Westgate and Arts Coop, clearly weakest in College High School's "circular" discussions, and intermediate in Lincoln Acres and Appelbaum; in the former a number of "consensus" decisions of dubious quality were made, and in the latter the planner made many specific decisions not well connected to each other or a larger framework.

Decision ownership, on balance, interacted with decision quality to reduce the over-all effectiveness of decision-making. For example, though Westgate planners' decisions were technically good, it was not always clear that all the planners believed in them. And in Lincoln Acres and Appelbaum, the planners' ownership of technically less-than-adequate decisions may have blinded them to better alternatives (and/or made implementation difficulties more likely).

Looking across the rows of Table 2, it seems plausible to rank Westgate 2 and 3, and Appelbaum, highest in achieved intermediate outcomes. Then come Arts Coop, followed by Lincoln Acres, and College High last. With uncertain resources and endorsement, and steadily poor decision-making to boot, it is perhaps no surprise that College High never made it. But do the rankings of the other schools on intermediate outcomes predict implementation success? Not very well. Although Arts Coop ranks first on both counts, and Appelbaum was roughly in the second rank of intermediate outcomes and the third rank of success, the rest show disparities.

Lincoln Acres did not do well on intermediate outcomes, largely because of the community conflict and a number of poor planning decisions. Yet its implementation was moderately good. We may perhaps invoke the strongly-held vision for the school, which was retained, and the steady, stabilizing leadership of the new principal in the second year.

As for Westgate: the good showing on intermediate outcomes was not matched by sustained implementation. The feature which most differentiated these two open-space schools from that at Lincoln Acres was <u>lack</u> of goal commitment, especially on the part of administrators. We should also note that the relatively high decision quality and ownership we saw was restricted to administrators: in Lincoln Acres by the end of the second year there was considerably more teacher involvement in decisions.

On balance, the goodness of intermediate (planning) outcomes predicts fairly well to implementation success for extreme cases: the aborted College High School, and the rather fully-implemented Arts Coop. Arts Coop was especially distinguished by widespread environmental endorsement (achieved by much hard work), and by good decision quality and ownership, especially during early planning. These factors were strong enough to help the school weather its financial uncertainties: among other things, they insured the creation of a crisp, actively-owned vision for the school, the recruitment of a strong director committed to the

vision, clear planning-implementation linkage, and the recruitment of capable and motivated students.

Our analysis of primary tasks below should shed more light on the predictors of implementaion success. Perhaps all we can say here is that strong, thorough planning makes a real difference, and weak, environmentally ineffective planning dooms a new school. But there are many ways in which moderately good planning can be nullified, and somewhat ineffective planning recouped during implementation.

Primary Tasks

Our general conceptual framework in Chapter 3, Part I, identified six major tasks that planning/implementation groups must face in the process of envisioning, designing and creating a new school: political stabilization, knowledge utilization, vision development, social-architectural design, actualization, and institutionalization. Below, we reflect on each of these tasks in turn, across our six schools.

Political Stabilization[1)]

The task here, to quote our earlier characterization, is

> obtaining and assuring a continued flow of financial resources and environmental endorsement, to support not only the planning/implementation process itself, but continued operations of the implemented school.

Before turning to the cases, we should outline a general framework within which to discuss issues of political stabilization.

All planned organizational change requires the mobilization of power and legitimacy: the more one possesses these resources, the greater the freedom of action one enjoys in pursuit of goals. Further, it must be borne in mind that these two types of resources may vary independently of one another. One may have legitimacy without power (e.g., charisma), and one may have power without legitimacy (naked force). Each of these options seems to be highly unstable, however: charisma degenerates into (or is overwhelmed by) bureaucratic power, and coercive power is violently contested unless combined with legitimacy. Thus, ideally one seeks to possess some combination of these resources. Of course there is a fourth possibility of possessing neither power nor legitimacy, except perhaps in a strictly pro forma sense. Each of these four types of situations has distinctive consequences for organizational planning and implementation of change.

---

1) This section was written by Sam D. Sieber.

Like all other resources that are sought by many parties within a finite system of resources, power and legitimacy are relatively scarce, and must often be sought at the expense of others' power or legitimacy. Thus, the means by which these political resources are sought and protected (e.g., cooptation, bargaining, coalition-building) is an important question--not only in its own right but because these means have critical consequences for the pursuit of substantive goals. Indeed, the acquisition and maintenance of power or legitimacy (political goals) may even supersede the pursuit of substantive goals. At one extreme, this may take the form of persistent decision-avoidance; at the other, it may take the form of total capitulation to forces that are opposed to substantive goals. Between these two extremes there lies a range of possible compromises with contending forces--compromises that may well alter one's original intentions.

In addition to formal compromise as a political mechanism, one may engage in informal, secretive, or even illicit tactics, such as circumvention of rules, bribes, concealment, and so forth. As useful as these tactics may be, they can also have deleterious consequences for goals, especially if a demand for accountability unveils their employment and destroys the legitimacy of the planner or implementer. These observations remind us that power may be exercised either formally or informally; and that the latter may be further divided into licit and illicit actions. What is more often overlooked, however, is that legitimacy itself may also be formal or informal.

All of these conditions and their consequences can be found in our case studies, and indeed, they seem to have played a role far more critical than rational decision-making with regard to substantive or professional issues. We will note in the next section that the utilization of expertise tends to be minimal in these enterprises: in contrast, political processes loomed significantly at every turning point in their history. The reason is simple. Schools are embedded in two power structures: (1) a large, complex bureaucracy reaching from the classroom to the central office, and linked to state and federal agencies that comprises numerous centers of power, and (2) a democratic structure based on local control by the community. Because the creation of a new school is a highly visible and costly innovation, the planner or implementer must seek to gain power and legitimacy from both of these power structures. And yet (and here we come to a point that is persistently and naively overlooked by students of educational innovation), these structures are fundamentally at odds with one another in the competition for educational control. This places new schools and their developers/implementers in the middle of a potential power struggle between local laymen and bureaucratic professionals. Because of their limited and essentially derivative power or legitimacy, the P/I team can neither stand aloof from this struggle nor resolve it. The best they can hope for are compromises that do not threaten the integrity of ultimate goals. (Sometimes they are shielded

from the struggle by the excessive power of one of the two structures. But then the danger emerges of being coopted by the demands of the more powerful, protective structure.)

In short, the planners and implementers of new schools enter an arena of latent, and often manifest, conflict. Not only do they trigger conflict by the differential impact of their activities on diverse stakeholders and by their effort to acquire enough authority to attain their goals (which means inroads on--or even a takeover of--someone else's authority), but they are caught in the middle of an enduring struggle between the professional bureaucracy and the community. The manner in which they handle these power struggles may determine the fate of their innovation.

But there is still another political factor that interferes with rational decision-making in new schools: the occurrence of major contingencies such as turnover in key personnel, loss of funds, delays in construction, outbreaks of social conflict elsewhere in the bureaucracy or community, and so forth. Such events have political impact inasmuch as they upset the balance of power that has been created in the past. This rearrangement occurs most obviously in the reduction or enhancement of the authority of those who are responsible for the organizational change. But it also occurs more indirectly: power is redistributed among various other stakeholders in the enterprise. Thus, major contingencies have political impact in addition to their obvious effect on routine administration. The best-laid plans may be thwarted by a sudden redistribution of power, or they may suddenly be brought closer to fruition. Such contingencies are too often ignored in research.

Having outlined a theoretical framework, let us proceed to flesh it out with historical events in the five case study sites.

Legitimacy vs. power. In all of the cases, the "planners" of the new schools were allotted a certain amount of formal legitimacy by their superiors. In no case, however, did these planners have the power (formal or informal) to implement what they had planned. This was most obvious in the case of College High School where "planning for the shelf" was a customary practice throughout the district. And here legitimacy tended to be predominantly informal:

> The primary political strategy that emerged might be labeled "personal politics" -- reliance on informal arrangements among people familiar with one another within the educational bureaucracy of Lakeport. A formal agreement on the constitution of the IDC and Steering Committee was never signed, nor was a resolution authorizing (or even favoring) the school. Promises that "space would be found," were obtained personally and orally from the Superintendent; promises to request the Superintendent to firm things up were obtained personally and orally from Haberman.

It is here that we witness the least successful acquisition of political resources in all of our case studies. While informal legitimacy allowed the planners to circumvent certain bureaucratic requirements, on balance it seems to have had negative consequences. Thus:

> Such political arrangements were fairly weak; they were not based on the express wishes of the groups involved but rather on informal arrangements between certain actors; sanctions for non-follow through could not be invoked. ...A formal agreement might have provided more power -- though this is far from clear; the lack of one did recurrently cast the group's legitimacy in doubt.

The tenuous nature of legitimacy was attributed by one of the planners to the fact that:

> the administration at the central office was never enthusiastic about the project. Lip service was constantly given, but I believe the record would show that wherever bureaucrats of central headquarters could have facilitated, they attempted to thwart. Some of that is excusable, given the very serious financial plight that both institutions were experiencing.

Another pointed out:

> ...my perception is that Haberman was directed by Stein to make no commitments but to give every semblance of cooperation in order to avoid political pressure or embarrassment for either Stein or the members of the Board of Education.

There seem to have been at least two reasons for this situation: the financial plight of the district, which overtook the planners (a major contingency limiting their authority); and the desire of the central administration and board to avoid a confrontation with the local community, which demanded its own high school (an effect of the power struggle between community and bureaucracy). The final outcome was a rash of decision-avoidance on the part of the planning group and the abortion of plans for the new College High School.

While the initial mandate of legitimacy was clearer in the other cases, a certain amount of ambiguity about the limits of authority persisted. The need for planners to establish their legitimacy, and especially in the eyes of the bureaucracy, was a recurrent one, therefore. As the planner stated in the Appelbaum case study:

> I had a difficult time at first trying to get people to take me seriously...I had to convince people that I had a right to files and to certain documents, and to be able to get in to see people and have easier access than was being allowed me.

Sometimes the planners confused their legitimacy with actual power to see that a plan was to be implemented. In the case of Arts Coop, this assumption was sorely vexed by subsequent events:

> During the early planning period, the planners had proceeded with the faith that their decisions and plans were backed by the power they held as formal participants in a carefully worked out regional cooperation. But they were to discover that some parts of their plan were vulnerable to manipulation by a person in a position of formal authority who took power and superseded the power of the plans...
>
> The planners, with unfounded trust and limited imagination, did not cover themselves on the legal and fiscal end of the governance arrangement, so it could easily be undone. With the threat to the governance structure, everything else in the plan was potentially threatened, since there was then little protection except for what was in writing in the grant proposals. The planners were now powerless as a group, with only their individual positions as sources of influence.

In short, legitimacy must not be taken for granted, and under no circumstances should it be confused with the power to realize one's goals. Further, informal legitimacy is ultimately weaker than formal legitimacy. Although it may be a necessary means for circumventing bureaucratic barriers, major contingencies can easily upset such informal arrangements.

But most important, the gap between planning and implementation also represented a sharp division between legitimacy and power, which in every case weakened the chance of implementing the original design. Further, this gap occurred <u>despite</u> efforts of planners and implementers to bridge it. The greatest effort in this respect was put forth in Arts Coop. And yet, the power of the implementer to comply with original plans was determined by still higher bureaucratic authority (the director of the intermediate agency and his state superiors). As the case study put it:

> Generally, Kelman (the director) did not view people or groups as legitimate unless they had some legal backing and protection...insufficient attention was going into the process of deepening and insuring legitimacy.

In the case of Appelbaum, the implementer simply ignored the sincere efforts of the planner to establish continuity and went off on his own tack.

This situation is by no means rare in the launching of social programs. Often legislators authorize a new program without allocating sufficient

power to its administrators. The program then suffers the fate of most enterprises whose legitimacy vastly exceeds their power: conflict with power holders elsewhere in the bureaucracy, demoralization of staff, broken hopes of clients, and ultimate failure. This was a common experience in the Great Society programs of the '60's.[2)]

The pursuit of legitimacy and power. The means whereby legitimacy or power are pursued also have decisive consequences for the enterprise. As we have noted in Chapter 3 of this Report:

> ...the work of the P/I group is as much devoted to the acquisition of resources and endorsement from the environment as it is to the internal, "technical" issues of what the school itself is to become. Political strategizing and action become crucial when questions arise like "Will the Board permit us to hire non-certificated teachers?", "How will we get the $25,000 for in-service training?", or "Will the community succeed in blocking the rezoning we know is necessary?"
>
> In our sites, we have noted several sub-areas of types of needed skill: circumvention, the ability to bend or avoid the effects of constraining rules or procedures; cooptation, the ability to cool out opposition and transform it into support; bargaining, the ability to achieve a negotiated balance of costs and benefits in interaction with others who control wanted resources; coalition-building, the ability to unite oneself and diverse others around a mutual interest; and buffering, the ability to protect the P/I enterprise and the emerging school from external pressures. (See Sullivan and Kironde, 1976)

In Arts Coop, following the dismissal of the (highly successful) key planner, it was necessary to engage in a number of illicit circumventions in order to open the school "in a fashion congruent with the planners' hopes." Thus, secret meetings had to be held. On occasion, such mechanisms may have a boomerang effect, as occurred with the tactic of trying to coopt parents in Lincoln Acres who were opposing the new open space school. As the case study points out: "the meetings, fueled by the direct contact the parent volunteers had had with what they saw as poor teaching, amplified rather than redirected the parents' objections."

Even if such tactics do not backfire, they can be demoralizing, since they are a constant reminder that one's efforts are not recognized or rewarded, and indeed are frowned upon. Further, circumvention (as well as buffering) in particular may entail a turning inward of the P/I team

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2) This discussion has primarily emphasized power and legitimacy during the planning period. We should note that once a school is actually launched, a good deal of de facto power devolves to those closest to the action, largely the principal and staff. Note that in the Westgate case, for example, just as the central office administrators could not compel the principals to implement open education (or even to seek help in doing so), the principals could not compel implementation from the teachers, who largely proceeded at their own pace.

that precludes further efforts to deal with external power relationships. Inward-facing stances usually self-defeating in the political arena. As the case study of College High School notes, "when environmental uncertainty became acute, there was a great deal of speculation, gossip and rumor, but little concerted effort to get real facts to guide next steps." And in the case of Lincoln Acres, one suspects that the faculty used techniques such as the "communications workshop" to reassure themselves and avoid contact with growing community disfavor. While this mechanism had the effect of integrating the planning group, it ill prepared them for the later onslaught of parental criticism. Thus, evasion may only aggravate the situation. (We shall return to this point later when we discuss school-community conflict in greater detail.)

All political bargaining within the educational bureaucracy has a potential impact on activities and goals. Planners and implementers must trade compliance with the demands of superiors for the necessary resources to carry out their work. Thus, as the Appelbaum case study observes:

> William Newman of the Bureau of Commercial Education, with whom Woodward (the planner) conferred many times, was viewed as being especially influential because, in Woodward's words, "he produces the budget that will go into the school." Thus, there is at least the suggestion that political expedience played a considerable role in planning the school's program.

And in the case of Arts Coop:

> The main problem with actualizing the school in a form congruent with what the planners had envisioned came from the intermediate agency's denial of the legitimacy of the program's governance. This affected not only the roles and power of the governing bodies and people, but interfered with some of the basic philosophy of the program, which the planners felt demanded flexibility, individual and situation-specific problem solving, and open-ended curriculum.

The agency's basis for control resided in its access to funds.

School and community. While political forces within the bureaucracy are powerful determinants of an innovation's inception, design, and ultimate form, conflict with the community is equally influential. Confrontation between the principle of professional control and the principle of community control becomes acute in the founding of new schools because of their high visibility, educational scope, and cost. And indeed, in all of our five case study sites, this conflict played a significant role in the schools' development.

In the case of College High School, the local community vigorously demanded a new school that it could control itself, when the idea of the campus school was broached in a public meeting. Thus, to avoid inflaming

the community further, planning proceeded without formal endorsement from the Central Office or Board. As we have already seen, this informal stance weakened the legitimacy of the planners and ultimately destroyed their vision.

In the Appelbaum case, a committee representing a militant parents' organization selected a principal for the school other than the key planner, partially because they resented any implication that the Board was using them to rubber-stamp its informal support for the planner. In any case, since the principal departed substantially from the planner's design, the action by the parents' group was a major factor in the school's future development.

Two other cases entailed more prolonged conflict, presumably because the smaller, suburban character of these districts made it more difficult for the bureaucracy to shield the new schools from community involvement and influence. (In contrast, both Appelbaum and College High School were located in a major city.)

In Westgate, apprehension over the community's possible rejection of two open education schools prompted officials to stress the traditional character of the new schools. Thus, the term "open education" was not mentioned to the Board in gaining their approval for the bond issue. Although open education was the goal of the district officials, "the planners were careful to make the distinction between 'open space' and 'open education' (a presumably more experimental approach that might find resistance in Westgate)." Later the principal said to our field worker:

> We've pretty much convinced them (i.e., parents) that we're not open education in the true sense of the word. That we're still doing things that same way, only in different spaces. So they're happy.

This evasion technique had several important consequences. For one, it prevented clear "ownership" of the innovation by the school staff; for another, it precluded a realistic assessment of the problems that would be entailed in implementation: and ultimately it encouraged abandonment of the initial vision. As the case study observes:

> /The principal/ continued to make it clear to teachers that they should move carefully. On November 8, an annotated "agenda" for one of the first long faculty meetings, read:
>
> > Please remember that our concept is open space with a team approach and not open education. Individualization should be done slowly and on a very structured basis. Pupils should not just work on their own without teacher supervision and checking.

Other means of defusing parental criticism in Westgate were use of the mass media to give a favorable impression of the innovation, splitting up parents among teachers during the Back-to-School Night, restricting the activities of the PTA to innocuous issues, and excluding parents from the planning process. However, not even these mechanisms prevented parents from learning about the experimental nature of the program. A few became quite critical and even withdrew their children from the schools. On the whole, however, approval was stronger than teachers believed it to be. According to our survey results: "In essence, teachers in both schools seriously underestimated the actual extent of parent knowledge and approval of most of the innovations." This does not mean that the mechanisms for insulating the new program from the community had been unnecessary, since the level of approval for open education was actually only 54%. And indeed, the school (No. 2) that engaged in the greater amount of change was less open with parents, and accordingly parents with children in this school were less likely to perceive the novel aspects of the school. (See survey results, Westgate case, pp. 198-9.) This suggests that greater parental knowledge and participation inhibited the innovative process in the other school.

It was in Lincoln Acres, however, that school-community conflict truly erupted. Demoralization of staff and substantial abandonment of the innovations was the outcome. And it is highly interesting that the various mechanisms that were employed to avert conflict only appeared to aggravate it. Thus, the school board promised to include at least one self-contained classroom in the new "open" structure school as a means of gaining passage of the bond issue. When it appeared that the promise was not being honored, the community rose up in arms. The Board's second nominal solution was to launch a survey to determine the wishes of all parents. The case study reports the outcome as follows:

> The Board's decision to require the community survey seemed crucial: it sharpened school-community conflict in many respects, though it was designed to reduce it. The survey permitted the Board of Education (and the educators) to bypass the original issue of whether or not the plans for the school honored the original design.

And as mentioned earlier, when cooptation of parents was attempted by inviting them to work as volunteers in the school, the parents used the opportunity to collect ammunition for their complaints against the school. In general, however, attempts were made to minimize direct contact with parents; and thus, the concessions that were made to the community by the administration demoralized the faculty who felt that their professionalism was being violated. Among other things, this resulted in the principal's loss of legitimacy in the eyes of his faculty.

Once again, then, we see that vulnerability to the environment and the desire to avoid conflict cause a school to withdraw into a self-protective shell, while the need to gain resources and parental support

requires open contact and negotiation with the environment. Nor are mere gestures toward the development of external relationships sufficient; indeed, in the absence of a candid atmosphere, they may backfire.

And yet, too much readiness to bargain with the environment can be equally detrimental, as shown by the case of Arts Coop High School. Here it was also anticipated that the new school would evoke protest from the community, especially since its regional basis meant a loss of local control, and regionalization was already a controversial issue in the state. But resistance to this loss of control (at least by the local superintendents, who presumably were reflecting their parental constituencies) was neutralized by the new director of the intermediate agency that had launched the project in the first place. This was done by offering fiscal advantages to the local districts throught the provision of centralized funding. This political bargain had negative consequences for the school, however; for it meant that greater power was yielded to the intermediate agency, and this power was used to force the school to comply with the new director's demands. These demands tended to dilute the school's original goals. And since, as already noted, the planners had legitimacy without power, they were unable to resist this domination by the intermediate agency.

In sum, the dilemma of environmental contact vs. avoidance was not solved in any of our case study schools in a way that fully protected the integrity of original goals. Indeed, it may well be impossible to do so, since major new innovations within existing power structures that possess only the legitimacy to plan require power, protection, and physical resources to bring plans to fruition. And this means that compliance with the demands of bureaucratic superiors and community groups must be traded for these resources. Where there is an underlying antagonism between professional and lay control of education, as is almost universal in America, compliance will be demanded not only for educational reasons, but for political reasons as well. Thus, rather than utopian breakthroughs, innovative new schools tend to become political battle-grounds where the first casualty is the innovative idea.

Knowledge Utilization[3)]

The second primary task posited in our framework was that of assuring the input of valid, technically-competent knowledge. As we suggested in Chapter 3:

> Since the schools we studied (and, indeed, all but a very few ground-breaking new schools) are not de novo creations, but rely on the importation and adaptation of educational practice from elsewhere, there is a steady need for P/I groups to locate, interpret and use the best available technical information from outside themselves.

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3) This section was written by Sam D. Sieber.

But a striking result of our research is that little sustained effort was made to employ information or technical assistance from external sources of expertise. One might assume that the design and implementation of highly innovative settings would afford both opportunity and pressure for using such expertise. But it appears that new schools are no more prone to seek outside help than schools that have been operating for some time. State or regional personnel were seldom sources of information and new ideas, and national data banks were never used. A review of the pertinent literature on proposed programs was rarely conducted. The planners tended to reject our offer of "human systems" consultants on a matching fund basis. As we pointed out in one of our progress reports:

> We repeatedly found...that using the sort of generalist consultant we had in our pool seemed to be relatively beyond the ken of all but our more sophisticated planners...It may well be that our entry would have been easier and simpler had we promised nothing but a research presence with occasional reports.

While another school was sometimes visited to observe a particular program, on the whole the staff tended to use expertise located within the school or district. This tendency apparently stemmed from the need to establish a sense of ownership or participation in the project and to gain political support internally. In Lincoln Heights, for example, a "communications workshop"[4] sought to facilitate the interaction of staff members and to give them a sense of full participation in designing and operating the new school. This approach seems to have been primarily successful, however, in building cohesion and isolating the staff from the external environment; this increased community hostility as well as minimizing any tendency to seek external resources. Thus, the integrative function of internal knowledge utilization impaired the pursuit of external assistance. In the case of Appelbaum high school, the need to gain the political support of district administrators in the city obliged the planner to solicit and follow the advice of headquarters personnel instead of turning to outside sources. (Only a single external consultant was utilized, and he was urged upon the planner by a member of the politically important Steering Committee.) In short, the focus on local expertise fulfills certain needs of the social system that conflict with the need for external knowledge.

No doubt the usual explanations for failure to use external expertise -- the reluctance to admit problems to outsiders, status threats from experts, ignorance of available channels, etc. -- also played a role.

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4) The workshop was itself run by an internal staff member rather than any of several available external consultants.

But the dilemma of being confronted with two antithetical system needs -- -- the need for external expertise vs the need for self-reliance -- seems to have been at the heart of the problem.

The tendency to resolve this dilemma in favor of self-reliance is fostered by certain circumstances. One of these conditions is peculiar to the creation of new organizations: the acute sense of insecurity associated with a new enterprise, and hence the need to prove that one is able to cope autonomously. To motivate and support personnel engaged in a venture of high risk, there must be a sense of autonomy and group supportiveness that will make it possible to believe that every contingency can be dealt with. In short, there must be a self-confident esprit; and this esprit is enhanced by demonstrating to others and to oneself that "we can do it ourselves." In the absence of a clear and imminent danger of disaster, therefore, outsiders are not solicited.

Another condition that shifts priority to internal resources is common to schools generally: the ideological stress on autonomy of the district, the school and the classroom. This emphasis, of course, reenforces the drive toward self-sufficiency. Still another common condition of educational organizations is local pressure for institutional conformity. Professional autonomy is largely an ideological feature or ideal of educators, while local conformity is a matter of structural reality. Pressures for conformity could be observed in the efforts to develop the curriculum for the schools, in the autocratic behavior of some principals and in the emphasis on staff consensus vis-a-vis the community (especially in Lincoln Acres). Thus, the ideology of autonomy and the reality of pressures toward conformity to local standards and procedures combined to discourage the pursuit of external knowledge. This tendency was probably reenforced by the insecurity of the staff as they faced novel and difficult tasks (as in Westgate).

Fortunately, we have one case study that exemplifies a high degree of external knowledge-seeking, and which therefore affords a pseudo-test for our theory. Here, for example, is how the case study writer characterized the planning phase at Arts Coop:

> The planning was characterized by a tendency to seek and use expert knowledge both from outside and inside the planning committee. Articles and books were exchanged at meetings, and newspaper clippings xeroxed and handed out. Individually, planners attended conferences on the gifted, alternative education, and as a group and as individuals, they visited other arts programs. Jane /the planner/ telephoned the relevant people in the environment to get answers and advice on such questions as certification, identifying talent, governance. ...The association with our research project is another example

> of the group's openness to knowledge. There were not access problems either at the initial interviews with Jane Sobel, Guy and Jean Janacek and Anthony Lombardo, or in the planning meetings proper.

And at a much later stage in the development of the school plans:

> The ideas and information for planning during this period came from the experiences of NCA / another similar school/ , from all the literature gathered during the Early Planning Period, and from David Steinhoff's past work and current readings/ interviews. David's experience at a California alternative high school gave him many ideas and points of comparison. He spent the summer reviewing research on the talented. He was connected to people in the fields of youth participation, educational research, and alternative education.

The features of this high school that set it apart from the other new schools and that seem to explain its openness to external influence are the following:

-- a new regional school rather than a new school within an existing district, and hence early planning by a regional service center rather than school staff members.

-- a curriculum with an inherent cultural emphasis on creativity and individuality (i.e., art, music, dance, etc.)

-- a part-time professional staff, which meant that other positions were available as buffer statuses in the event of failure.

-- planners and implementers with cosmopolitan backgrounds.

It seems plausible that these features of Arts Coop immunized it from pressures to focus solely on local resources. Thus, the regional character of the new school protected it from being subverted by pressures for conformity stemming from a particular district or community. The inherent emphasis on cultural creativity in the school's curriculum was a further influence in the direction of non-traditionalism. (In contrast, it is interesting to observe the intense pressures for routinization that were found in Appelbaum, a high school for business careers.) Indeed, these features of the new school created so strong a sense of autonomy from local structures that grave problems arose in the school's relationship with the local intermediate service center that had spawned it. Moreover, the part-time nature of the staff may have given them a

certain sense of security since their livelihoods were not totally dependent on the success of the school. Thus, the insecurity associated with such ventures may have been diluted, making it less important to coalesce into a defensive, self-reliant group.

The only feature that was not mentioned in our "theory" is the cosmopolitan backgrounds of the planners and implementers in Arts Co-op. This was probably largely a function of the non-local nature of the enterprise. Rather than recruiting automatically from internal district staff, as happened in all the other schools we studied, the Arts Coop reached out for persons with specialized backgrounds. We should note that Jane Sobel's cosmopolitan background led her strongly toward a "knowledge utilization" ideology; she not only had a strong hand in recruiting another cosmopolitan, David Steinhoff, as director, but worked closely with him during early implementation. And though Steinhoff was cosmopolitan re new and alternative schools, he did not define himself as "expert" in art, the focus of the new school. Thus his natural knowledge-seeking inclinations were reinforced by an admitted need for knowledge in this case. (In contrast, key planners for College High School and for Lincoln Acres defined themselves as expert.)

For all these reasons, then, the dilemma between the need for self-sufficiency and the need for external expertise was resolved in favor of the latter at Arts Co-op.

Vision Development[5)]

The next primary task in our framework, to quote Chapter 3 again:

> involves the development of coherence among several products of the P/I group's work: their underlying educational philosophical position, the goals they hold for this school in particular, and their vision (a sort of rough sketch or image of the school). The question is: do these products match or fit well with each other? Do they form a coherent whole, or are there internal contradictions?

As we have seen, one primary reason for non-coherence in visions is the tendency for P/I groups to move toward revising their goals in the face of various pressures rather than adhering to them. Why should this be?

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5) This section was written by David E. Wilder.

The planners and implementers of any new school that openly attempts to be innovative are faced with the special task of having to convince a wide range of constituents that whatever is conspicuously different about the new school is nevertheless desirable, because it is better than current practice. When we consider the weak knowledge base of education generally, and the poor knowledge utilization habits of most of the planners and implementers we have studied, we can conclude that there is little convincing ammunition available for the persuasive task. So perhaps it is not surprising that in our sites the dilemma of goal adherence vs. revision has been prominent--and was usually resolved toward the revision horn. Furthermore, the goals of new schools most prone (or vulnerable) to revision were more often than not the innovative ones. In short, the same innovative goals that can symbolically integrate a new school, and give it a unique identity and meaningful purpose, can also be the most difficult to sustain within the context of American education in the 1970's.

Reasons for goal revision. Why should innovative goals (and the vision they represent) be so vulnerable to change? We have encountered a number of reasons during our study.

1. Lack of power and legitimacy in original planning mandate. College High School presents the most extreme example. Because the mandate was so vague, the powers so limited and future events so uncertain, decision avoidance and planning for the shelf became regular practices in the planning group. At Appelbaum, Ann Woodward complained that she was not taken seriously and was unable to get access to information she needed. Later the legitimacy of many of the innovative goals she originated was denied by Lassiter: denying that Woodward was a (legitimate) planner was also a denial of the goals she had proposed for the school.

2. Diffuse or too-specific goals. At Lincoln Acres a heavy commitment was made by school staff to a specific form of open education and team teaching which later had to be disguised from the community and eventually abandoned. Westgate, in contrast, stated similar goals in more general terms and was able to move slowly toward them, without total commitment, and back off when things got too hot.

But goals can be too diffuse; College High School planners had to repeatedly redefine and reshape their goals because of the vagueness with which they were originally stated.

3. Poor internal consistency of goals, or poor linkage to social architecture. College High School again provides the best example. Almost from the beginning there were implicit contradictions between the types of students and the outcomes expected, and between the core-goal of a "humane environment" and the "family structure proposed.

4. Lack of sufficient technical knowledge to implement important goals. The Lincoln Acres staff was unable to demonstrate convincingly that it could do educationally what it said it wanted to do. The technical competence of key parents (e.g., Charles Frisch) made the staff's inadequacies plain.

5. Turnover of key personnel during the P/I process. The most striking example comes from Appelbaum: when Harold Lassiter as principal followed Ann Woodward as planner, key goals and the school's basic direction were altered quite basically.

6. Failure to adequately socialize or coopt new members of the P/I system. The Westgate teachers' lack of ownership of the "open education" goals was in part a result of weak preliminary training efforts and minimal support during early implementation. But socialization efforts also made for goal-related problems when they were too thorough: teachers were in effect over-socialized in isolation from community members, and became so committed to their ideas that the conflict was sharp and some core ideas had to be abandoned, with a good deal of pain.

7. Structural constraints in the educational environment. These were significant factors for all sites studied. For example, College High School found that their original concept of the "family" was in violation of the union contract. Arts Co-op had to comply with pressures to keep attendance and to give grades on report cards. Lincoln Acres was forced to bring its reading program back into a traditional mold. Ken Braun at Westgate cited board and district policies as constraints, and Lassiter had a list of these as well.

8. Inability to obtain expected resources. Again, all sites were to some extent plagued by financial problems but other resources were also troublesome. Some, notably Appelbaum, to some extent Arts Co-op, and potentially College High School, had problems getting the types of students they had anticipated, and all had staffing problems. All were given by key participants as reasons for altering certain goals.

9. Supposed neglect of "basic education." The Lincoln Acres version of open education had this appearance to key parents who had access to classrooms. Well before the time favorable reading scores became available in the Spring, the damage was done.

We could add to this list such "internal" factors as poor communication between P/I leaders and members, inadequate group process within the P/I group, low commitment of administrators or faculty to key goals, etc., but the above should be sufficient to illustrate the fact that innovative goals are decisively vulnerable to a number of revisionary forces throughout the P/I process.

In some ways, however, the last problem cited, the need to attend to basic education regardless of what else is going on, may be the most powerful, and it cuts across all the others. While it is frequently announced that the 1970's have seen a "return to the basics" in education, studies done in previous decades have consistently shown that teaching the three R's and otherwise conveying information to students takes precedence over all other educational goals in the U.S. Consequently, any apparent departure from this priority is immediately vulnerable to criticism.

One hypothesis that follows is that schools designed for special purposes or special populations are best able to maintain their innovative features and goals in an essentially conservative environment. The two special schools in our study present an interesting partial test for this hypothesis. Arts Co-op was conceived and designed as self-consciously different from other schools. By definition, the students it sought to recruit were a special group who often did poorly (or were not ministered to adequately) in regular schools. These assumptions did not come into question after the formation of the school. Some of the structural features of the school, some of its practices, and some of the individuals were challenged, but the general license to innovate remained intact. Julius Appelbaum was also created as a special-purpose school and was given a somewhat similar license. That it did not turn out to be as innovative as originally planned was the result of factors already described. However, while it had no mandate to innovate, its <u>license</u> to innovate remains intact. (And that is perhaps one of the chief reasons why the researchers found their sense of disappointment at its eventual lack of innovativeness so difficult to conceal.) Ironically, Appelbaum even has a reputation as innovative today because of its extensive use of computers and scheduling cycles.

A second hypothesis suggested by our data is that the emphasis of educators on teaching-learning <u>process</u> is often in conflict with the emphasis on <u>outcomes</u> or products held by the public, and that innovative goals that stress process will be vulnerable to the claim that outcomes are being neglected. This problem was most evident at Lincoln Acres, where the conflict over teaching-learning methods became bitter, with many parents convinced that basic learning was being slighted. A similar conflict began surfacing at Westgate (recall the parent who cried, "How can you take a test with all this noise? What is going on in this school? Why are people putting up with this nonsense?"), but the principals and staffs involved were able to contain the conflict partly through buffering and avoidance, and partly because their vision was loosely held, and could serve as a political stabilizer and conflict avoidance mechanism. The rigid stance toward goals taken by teachers at Lincoln Acres did not permit this. Conflict between process and outcome goals also surfaced at CHS within the planning group. Even at Arts Co-op, the initial goals of discovery and exploration of talent later gave way to pressure to shift toward individual and collective products (and this, it turned out, even had some positive integrative consequences for the school). In effect, every

school studied experienced the need to shift from a process to an outcome emphasis at some time during the P/I process. Even the special-purpose schools were not free from this constraint.

A corollary is that innovative goals can best be sustained within non-special purpose schools when they are seen as adjuncts to a sound basic education program that emphasizes learning outcomes. This is the stance to which Westgate successfully retreated, like Lincoln Acres during its second year of operation.

Social-Architectural Design[6)]

As we noted earlier, this primary task involves

> the development of an organizational design which is linked to (follows from, is congruent with, matched to) the goals/philosophy/vision of the earlier planning, and a relevant plan for "peopling" the design with staff and students, which is well linked with the vision, and with the design.

Social-architectural design is one of the most critical primary tasks, in our view. It is the intervening step between vision and actualization; it is here that social blueprints are made that will have an enduring, constraining, and significant effect on what the school actually looks like and how it is related to its environment. "Peopling" plans will determine in a very fundamental way who the basic actors turn out to be.

What are the ideal-typical requirements for effective attention to this primary task? We will list them briefly, then review each requirement and draw generalizations and examples from the six sites.

Generally speaking, social-architectural design (abbreviated to SA design below) will not occur (except accidentally and tacitly) unless P/I group members are aware that such an activity is needed, and they have some commitment to explicit construction of an anticipated social reality.

SA design work also requires a reasonably clear set of prior goals, a vision to which a social blueprint must be appropriately matched, along with a set of design requirements (needs which the new school's socio-technical organization will have to meet); there must also be specified a set of constraints or boundary conditions, the "givens" of the new school.

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6) By Matthew B. Miles.

In addition, SA design work requires that its practitioners have a working "bank" of concepts, more or less explicit schemata or maps of various aspects of new schools: these may range from "classes," "individualization," "materials," "departments," "time schedules" to "norms," "coordination" and "feedback methods."

But general concepts are not enough: SA design also requires a bank of alternative components: specific mechanisms, structures, technologies, arrangements, set-ups. These are ways of operationalizing or exemplifying general concepts about the socio-technical system of the new school. Examples are "steering committees," "learning centers," "feedback questionnaires," "teaching teams," "parent newsletters."

In addition, SA design requires that time and energy be devoted to the task: this characteristically means that P/I groups need a protected social/temporal space, defined specifically for the purpose.

Finally, SA design requires the presence of matching/comparison processes: the emerging design must be well linked to the original vision, meet the design requirements, etc. And the peopling plan must be (a) congruent with the vision; (b) congruent with the design. Without such matchings, the way is open for a school quite unlike its planners' hopes, or a design subverted by its operators and inhabitants.

What can we say about our six schools in relation to these requirements for SA design?

Awareness. Generally speaking, SA design did not loom large to planners as a potentially needed activity in our sites. For example, even though one administrator in Westgate said:

> Ken and I need help and expertise in changing attitudes... something like Mike did with the physical architecture, but with the social architecture.

there seemed little awareness of what this might actually involve in actuality. Only in Arts Co-op did there seem to be a direct acknowledgment of the idea that direct attention to SA design would be needed. In the remaining sites, while planners were in fact doing SA design work by default, they did not think of themselves as doing so. As the College High School case writers put it, "What's to design?"

Commitment. This too, except again for Arts Co-op, seemed minimal. At College High School, the planners were shocked that consultants who offered to help them with this and other tasks cost $200 a day, and rejected their assistance. And we note that although that school was integrally hung around the idea of using campus resources in the learning process, the planners apparently never felt they should design such matters as faculty teaching schedules, and roles, governance, salaries, student access to college courses, or the like.

Similarly, though the Lincoln Acres principal and staff were well aware that they faced a good deal of community conflict over their hopes for the school, they did not consider any durable structure for managing such conflict, or permitting parental influence. Rather, they proposed (and used) ad hoc mechanisms such as small meetings and a survey. Their low commitment to SA design in this case seemed driven by ambivalence: they opted for environmental avoidance rather than contact.

Goals, design requirements, constraints. Here there was much departure from our ideal-typical model. For one thing, goals for the various schools were often diffuse or uncertainly held, as in the College High School ambivalence between preparing inner-city students for college careers vs. simply using college courses as enrichment. In Westgate, the two key principals were far from committed to "open education." And even in schools with a fairly articulate and crisp vision (Arts Co-op), much re-working, reformulation, and development of ownership of goals had to occur. So the idea that an abstract set of goals needs to exist before SA design can occur is not a good match to what happened.

And so far as we can see, the idea of "design requirements" never surfaced very clearly, even in Arts Co-op, which spent so much time in design work. For example, when the director said to the staff:

> Think of the social reality - it's going to be weird. Kids from totally white communities going to school with minority kids for the first time, and kids from the inner city going to school with suburban kids for the first time. Don't underestimate that.

this was, in effect, a tacit design requirement: the school would have to be one that coped effectively with this anticipated social reality. But we note that the director had also pre-decided not to confront ethnic issues head on, but to concentrate on quality program development, so that students could interact through the arts.

The problem of constraints is interesting on two counts. In several cases constraints were specified early during planning and never questioned, though they easily could have been (e.g., the Westgate decision to equalize the size of all four elementary schools, which required elaborate planning for rezoning). And in some cases, we saw that matters which were properly SA design decisions assumed the value of "givens" very early in the planning process (for example, the idea that Arts Co-op would be a half-time program taught by practicing artists; or the concept of pod teams in Westgate).

Thus the general picture is one of shifting and redefined goals, and a blurring of these with half-seen design requirements and a set of largely unquestioned constraints.

Conceptual schemes. The implicit mapping of new schools inferrable from the case studies has several characteristics. First, as might be expected, it tends to emphasize the technical rather than the social parts of the system: most discussion focused on matters of texts, record-keeping, learning centers, schedule and the like. Only in Arts Co-op did we note much attention to matters such as teacher-pupil relationships, climate and internal governance. Although the Lincoln Acres faculty did spend some time during their summer planning on role definitions and decision-making methods, they, like the Appelbaum faculty, spent most of their energy, "naturally", in getting ready for the direct delivery of instruction.

A second theme was that schemata tended to be personalistic, rather than organizationally focused. For example, Westgate planners saw team composition as a matter of "compatibility," and when consultant Orenstein helped teachers during the summer planning to think about organizational-level issues, such as the need for coordination and principal-staff communication, the recommendations were ignored.

A third, rather interesting theme was a reluctance to create role differentiation. Though Arts Co-op, Lincoln Acres, and Westgate all had small working units (teaching teams, departments), all rejected the idea of team leaders or department heads. This was usually justified on ideological grounds (leaders would be "hierarchical") and sometimes financial ones (they would cost more). But in none of these three cases did the planners' schemata, apparently, take account of the need for inter-group coordination, problem-solving and planning--a need which group leaders could fill, and a need which, as it turned out, was quite crucial in both Lincoln Acres and Arts Co-op.

Alternative components. Three generalizations can be made here. First, the bank of alternatives considered was usually not wide. Planners tended to consider one or two possibilities, and to firm up on them relatively quickly. The College High planners settled on the concept of the "family" rapidly during their planning retreat; as far as we know, no other general forms of organizing students and teachers were considered. That meant in turn that the "family"--about which there was subsequently much disagreement and uncertainty--became very central in the design, and little else was accomplished from an SA design point of view.

Second, the most typical alternatives chosen were familiar, not novel ones. Given the limited awareness and commitment to designing, and the narrow range of schemata, that may well have been a wise strategy. As the Westgate case points out:

> The P/I group seems to have made the natural and energy-saving assumption that "everyone knows what a school is like"; roles such as principal, teachers...children organized by grade levels...librarian, a PTA and a general faculty meeting for information-handling simply fell into place because no one thought to do otherwise. And the role relations among these actors similarly went unquestioned.

The case calls this an "off-the-shelf" design. Such designs do provide economy of effort, maximize available skills, and make the implementation of the new school less stressful. But (as in Westgate and Appelbaum) they may also be poorly fitted to particular needs of a new school, and make it more likely that the innovation will be lost.

A third generalization is that component selection was more frequently carried out explicitly in relation to internal issues-- while components relating to the environment were underplayed. The Lincoln Acres staff repeatedly postponed attention to mechanisms for coordinating with, and buffering the school from parents and citizens. Their ad hoc efforts later on only worsened the conflict with the community. And even the care the Arts Co-op planners took to design an external governance structure proved to have serious flaws because they made many unfounded assumptions (see case, p. 84), a behavior which was quite infrequent when they were considering the internal functioning of the new school.

Time and energy investment. Our experience does nothing to disconfirm the comment made by Clark (1972):

> Organizational design is a fragmentary, demanding, and exciting activity that requires considerable patience, persistence and luck.

But most of our sites (with the possible exception of Arts Co-op) did not set aside much time for explicit SA design work. The College High planners made much progress in their early retreat when they did so, but never managed to protect enough space for design work afterward. The summer institutes at Appelbaum, Lincoln Acres, and Westgate were largely devoted to final implementation planning, usually on a teacher-by-teacher or team-by-team level, with SA design work either having been completed before this, or treated as taken for granted.

Both the Lincoln Acres and the Arts Co-op case point to another interesting issue: a good deal of SA design work was done implicitly and organically, "in the chinks" of final planning and early implementation, rather than being marked off explicitly as such. As the Arts Co-op case points out:

> The Director and his newly-chosen staff... were making conscious decisions about the social system of the program--what they wanted the school to be like. At the same time, an organic, non-rational and non-conscious process was occurring--the social organization was developing as the result of people's coming together for a common purpose.

The same process was discernible at Lincoln Acres, where certain structural decisions (such as twice-weekly faculty meetings, the absence of team leadership and the principal's consultative style seemed to be generating informal (but very strong) norms such as "everyone's ideas are okay" and "we know better than the parents." Note too that when the principal and resource teacher at Lincoln Acres "engineered" an important SA design decision (to reorganize the grade levels as a compromise), it had important back effects on the social system that had evolved, creating strain and the seeds of distrust. So SA design is taking place "in real time," as it were; it is being carried out both explicitly and implicitly by the very same social system that is itself being "designed."

Matching/comparison processes. The systematically-planned Arts Co-op program was well-connected to its original vision, and the plans for recruiting a director, staff and students were similarly well-matched. Insuring such congruence was never easy, but it did occur: we infer the presence of habitual comparisons and relevance-checking. At the other extreme, the College High School planners only occasionally protested (for example) that the "family" was getting so large (136 students) that it was no longer a design that would be "humane," and never followed through to reduce this discrepancy.

Weak matching efforts were evident in the provision of structures which would permit but not necessarily support a desired outcome (as in the Westgate team set-up, which lacked any explicit mechanism for consultation and training assistance to teachers who had never team-taught before). And it was often the case that goals existed for which no structures at all were designed (e.g., the wish for Lincoln Acres to be a "beacon" for other schools).

Because planners intuitively understand that the quality of people recruited to a new school--its director, the "staff, the students-- has a powerful effect (and that the effects of resocialization are often only incremental), matching/comparison processes were usually more in evidence when the "peopling" part of SA design work was being considered. Explicit criteria for principals and staff members were typically set out, and selection processes (as in Lincoln Acres, Arts Co-op) carefully defined. But we also note that involuntary assignment to a new school (Westgate, Appelbaum) was not rare, and that selection/allocation decisions were sometimes incongruent with other design decisions. (The best example is the creation of teaching teams at Westgate, each composed of "open" and "traditional" teachers to appease the community; little thought was given to the difficulty in team planning this decision would create.)

What can we conclude from this review of the "requirements" for SA design, as seen in our ideal-typical model? Given the relative implementation success of Arts Co-op, the site with the most thorough SA design work, we might consider it a relatively important task. But since primary

tasks in our view are roughly cumulative and sequential, it follows that a clear, owned vision is also a prime precondition for implementation success; so, it could be argued, is good knowledge utilization, which too was high at Arts Co-op.

Secondly, it seems quite clear that SA work does not proceed, even in its most vigorous forms, in a linear, step-wise fashion: planners work through a welter of shifting goals, requirements, constraints, concepts, design options: SA design is more the creation of a mosaic than an engineering (or even "architectural") task. From this point of view, the improvement of SA design work would rest not so much in efforts to improve "rationality," in the narrow sense, as in helping planners be more aware of just where they are in the mosaic at any point. Too, they would need to realize that strategies such as protecting time and energy for designing, considering a wide range of alternatives, and anticipating how well an implemented option will match the original vision are necessary.

Actualization[7)]

Our fifth primary task was defined as:

> implementing or actualizing the school, bringing about a congruent realization of the organizational and peopling designs. Essentially, the linkage involved is between planning and implementation.

Actualization is not a straightforward process like that involved in putting up a building from a blueprint. A good deal of trouble-shooting and adjustment is needed during early stages; much happens that was unforeseen, unpredicted; there are numerous dire consequences of what had seemed innocently-made design decisions; much simply "evolves" during the struggle to cope with the pressures of early implementation.

Our sites varied substantially in their actualization "styles"; after reviewing this we discuss three possible underlying factors: planning/implementation linkage, investment development, and social support. We conclude with some comments on the question of "collegial" and "bureaucratic" models of organization as they were exemplified during the actualization process.

Actualization styles. Arts Co-op fairly promptly achieved an actualization that was nearly a full realization of the original vision, even though it remained vulnerable to political pressures from its parent agency. Westgate's style was different: beginning with a good deal of difficulty and stress, there was gradual and incremental actualization of a moderate amount of the vision. Appelbaum lost much of the original vision, and

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7) By Matthew B. Miles and Barry A. Gold.

became actualized in forms largely resembling that of other urban vocational schools. Finally, for Lincoln Acres there was a reasonably good initial actualization, followed by a sharp discontinuity, and gradual movement back toward original hopes over the following years. What might account for these differences?

Planning/implementation linkage. Our framework makes a good deal of the idea that plans need close linkage to the actual process of producing the new school. In point of fact, Lincoln Acres (where linkage was closest-- planners became operators) suffered the worst actualization discontinuity. As we have seen, this was a function of high staff investment (see below) along with inadequate internal coping and coordination in tandem with acute environmental pressure. So close linkage may be necessary, but is not sufficient. In Arts Co-op there was fairly close linkage through continuing planner presence, a documented vision, and a director recruited to actualize it; full actualization followed.

The Westgate schools were so minimally "planned" that the idea of linkage made little sense. The P/I linkage devices at Appelbaum (documents, meetings, suggestions for key staff) faded into nothingness beside the brute fact that the principal, selected without regard to the planner's hopes, had no ownership whatever of the plans. In the final stages of the College High School effort, the main linkage was through the person of the planner-turned-director. But the substantive linkages were so weak that even before the abort decision it was clear the school might not look much like the original vision.

Investment development. The early actualization at Lincoln Acres can largely be laid to the investment teachers had developed through consensual participation in the final planning process, to the norms that had developed through this participation, and to the structures they had put in place (faculty and team meetings, for example). The late planning at Arts Co-op was also aimed in this direction, and succeeded moderately well. The CHS acting director's hope was to accomplish high ownership with the Holmes teachers--even if some aspects of the vision were to be lost in the process. At Westgate investment development was extremely limited, partly because the principals had little real investment themselves, and confidently expected that "They /the teachers/ can make it work. They could make anything work." Finally, at Appelbaum, there was little or no effort to increase investment, aside from exhortations at the summer institute, and the principal was relatively resigned to the fact that many teachers had come to the school without much interest in its goals or hopes.

Support. That low initial investment need not necessarily mean poor actualization is shown in the Westgate case. Given the fact that the physical set-up and the original social-architectural "design" required teams of teachers to work together, they gradually began to do so, under much stress, with minimal training or consulting support, and with their complaints ignored or rejected. Like the Appelbaum teachers, they too had very little commitment to the innovative vision. But the bright

side of non-support is that teachers have autonomy: they can invent solutions to their pains, can feel free to experiment, try things, develop linkages with colleagues, engage in problem-solving at the micro-system level. This did in fact happen in Westgate over the first implementation year. It occurred more directly and vigorously in School 2, where the principal was clearly seen as supplying social support, and as permitting the emergence of informal support systems within and across teaching teams. Support is a two-edged sword: those teachers in Westgate School 3 who were basically opposed to open education managed not only to support each others' resistance, but to discourage the implementation of others. But in School 2, even though original participation in planning, early investment and prior training [8] had all been weak, developing support systems won out.

We should also note the importance of strong support by Alberta Bard during later implementation at Lincoln Acres. It seemed less critical at Arts Coop, given the segmented (teacher by teacher) nature of the program and the clear vision, and least crucial of all at Appelbaum, where teachers were not being asked to do much that was new or difficult for them.

Collegial and bureaucratic models of organization. Underlying the planning and implementation efforts of the six new schools described in our case studies are two models of formal organization: the bureaucratic and the collegial.[9] In each school the planners attempted to create collegial or "human relations"-oriented structures as alternatives to some aspects of bureaucratic ones. For example, in the three open-space elementary schools at Westgate and Lincoln Acres, the objective was to create semi-autonomous teaching teams, units within the organization based on lateral authority relationships instead of the hierarchical authority structures commonly found in rational bureaucracies. In the instance of College High School, although the plan was not implemented, the vision was of a "humane" learning environment composed of "family" groups--clearly an anti-bureaucratic, if not entirely collegial, form of organization. Similarly, the director of Arts Co-op intended to create a sense of "community" in the school. Finally, the initial planner of Appelbaum High School sought to reduce status distinctions between teachers and students; the implementers, although less concerned with promoting a human relations atmosphere, attempted to individualize the program, away from batch processing

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8) As noted earlier, Berman and McLaughlin (1977) have showed very clearly that these four variables are closely related to the degree of implementation of innovative change programs. They too emphasized support as crucial.

9) For the most part, the planners' immages of the organizations they were constructing were underdeveloped and inexplicit. These images can, however, most easily be captured by the bureaucratic/collegial distinction. Other perspectives such as contingency theory (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), systems theory (Katz and Kahn, 1966) and loose-coupling theory (Weick, 1976) are also useful for analyzing organizational change, but do not appear to fit the cases as well.

of students. However, it should be evident by now that the achievement of collegial forms of organization was ephemeral in several sites and never realized in others. Why so?

1. The nature of bureaucratic and collegial organizations. Before we examine explanations for the difficulties planners faced in actualizing their implicitly-collegial visions, a few comments on the meaning of the terms "bureaucratic" and "collegial" are in order.

The terms "bureaucratic" (rationalistic) and "collegial" (human relations) are used here as constructs intended to provide a conceptual scheme and identify variables useful in understanding observed empirical regularities in formal organizations. They are not used to denote a "pure"--in the sense of perfect--set of institutional relationships that strictly conform to a model.

For present purposes we will use the comparison of the properties of bureaucratic and collegial organizations developed by Litwak and Meyer (1974). See Chart 1.

Generally, the schools we studied were planned with heavy doses of rhetoric favoring collegiality. For example, many aspired to create interpersonal relationships that were informal and personal, and attempted to incorporate such relationships into the plans. In other areas, however, there was either no awareness that a particular dimension of organizations should be part of the plan, or there was lack of clear commitment to designing a particular set of social arrangements. A frequently-noted example of the former is a lack of boundary maintenance roles (this is discussed further below). There seemed to be lack of commitment to designing such organizational characteristics as whether performance guides were to be a priori or internalized, the location of policy making and evaluation and the division of labor. These were often not explicitly decided on, and usually took the form in the plans of a de facto mixture of the elements of both types of organization. As the schools developed, however, most moved at various rates toward a form of organization that closely approximated the bureaucratic one (Westgate 2 is perhaps the exception).

Chart 1

PROPERTIES OF BUREAUCRATIC AND COLLEGIAL ORGANIZATIONS

Dimensions of Organizational Structure	Rationalistic (Bureaucratic)	Human Relations (Collegial)
Authority structure	hierarchy	collegial
Division of labor	specialist	generalist
Interpersonal relations	impersonal	personal
Performance guides	a priori rules	internalized goals
Goals or policy setting	separation of policy & administrative decisions	merger of policy and administrative decisions
Personnel assignment	merit	merit

2. Reasons for failure to actualize collegial forms. The argument presented here is that explanations of the failure to actualize collegial organizations and movement toward bureaucratic forms that are based on one or two variables such as the extent of re-socialization, or leadership performance (See Gross, et al., 1971) are inadequate. We do not discount such variables as important factors. Instead, they are viewed as part of a complex of variables that interact to produce the process of bureaucratization.

A review of the six cases suggests that the pattern of development of bureaucratic organizational structures is something like this: If there is (1) incompleteness of organizational design, the operational plan for the school, this interacts with (2) the socialization process, the learning of new behaviors, which then influences and is influenced by (3) environmental stress that the emerging organization encounters. Below we discuss each of these variables in turn, with examples from the case studies.

3. Design. The poet Delmore Schwartz's enigmatic title "In Dreams Begin Responsibilities" should serve as an aphorism for every planner of new organizations. Organizational design requires the creation of roles (positions) which encompass rules, rights and duties, and the assignment of tasks for the accomplishment of goals. In other words, much of organizational design is the assignment of responsibilities. In this area, many of the planners were fairly weak; roles and responsibilities were either not made explicit in many cases, or were taken for granted, or left to evolve under the pressure of operation. As we have noted above, inattention to social-architectural design caused serious problems in actualization.

In the Westgate and Lincoln Acres team teaching schools there were no team leaders. The result of this was problems in communication between the team and the administration, and within the teams. In Westgate School 2 this lack was alleviated via the natural development of "helping" relationships among the teachers. Similarly, in Arts Co-op there were no intermediate positions of authority such as department heads, and communication between and among the teachers and the director suffered.

It seemed there was an ideologically-motivated denial of the existence of power, authority and conflict in the schools. For example, the choice not to have team leaders in Lincoln Acres seemed an effort to make the team members equal and thus to assume the same burden of responsibility in the team. In Arts Co-op, the commitment to the establishment of cohesive feelings among the faculty apparently led to the rejection of the idea of department heads.

In general, the "human relations" ideology that communication should be open, direct and trusting also contributed to a fear of creating too many layers of formal authority; besides, clear-cut positions with attendant responsibilities would only be like the non-innovative schools in the districts, and should be avoided to retain the legitimacy of the innovation.

There were other design weaknesses. In College High School, although the consequences of the organizational design cannot be known since the plan was not implemented, we can speculate that the failure to establish linkages between the high school and college would have resulted in major organizational problems, particularly in the areas of resource allocation and governance.

Boundary-spanning roles were neglected in all of the sites. Relations with important external groups such as parents, local and regional educational bureaucracies were conducted in a largely ad hoc, unsystematic way. Control over, or at least peaceful co-existence with these groups is necessary for the implementation of a new educational organization.

Overall, many of our sites' problems in communication (both inter- and intra-organizational), authority structure and the task structure (division of labor) were a result of the absence of important roles. In some cases (e.g., Westgate teachers, the resource teachers at Lincoln Acres) role unclarity was a problem (cf. Gross, 1971). But vague roles had a way of getting clarified and stabilized; where roles were missing, the consequences were much more severe.

4. Socialization. In this section, two aspects of socialization[10] will be considered: internalization of values and the acquisition of new behavior, or role performance. The cases show us that there can be a large gap between these two aspects of socialization; values can be learned and accepted but for a variety of reasons fail to be translated into concrete behavior. Two sites provide interesting examples of this as well as suggesting another problem in organizational change: the possibility of oversocialization.

In Arts Co-op the values and role performance abilities of the teachers were largely set prior to their arrival at the school. They were recruited because of their commitment and talent in their artistic area; no extensive attempt was made to resocialize them. This set of values, the artistic self-concept, while of central importance for the general aims of the school, contributed to an inability to develop interdisciplinary community-building activities. These values, held too by the director, may also have created strained relations with the major outside bureaucracy, the regional agency. The faculty and director were oversocialized into one set of values--the artistic--and undersocialized into another--the bureaucratic/political. (This reasoning was used in the regional agency's attacks on David Steinhoff's leadership of the school.) The school's survival was threatened because the institutional arrangements needed to support teaching could not be maintained--not because the teachers were untalented or unskilled.

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10) For present purposes, recruitment is considered as part of socialization; people are recruited because of the characteristics they have gained in prior socialization experiences.

In the case of Lincoln Acres, the values and ideals of open education were quite well internalized by the faculty members, but the ability to translate them into teaching performance was absent. The absence of coordinative team leader roles exacerbated the problem: the principal (and indeed other teachers) were not wholly aware of the difficulties, and coherent problem-solving and performance improvement were hampered. In addition, when the community expressed disfavor with teaching performance, the reaction of the faculty was to hold tenaciously to its beliefs. This led to organizational rigidity; the ability to compromise with community members was lost--and so, eventually, was the program as originally planned.

In both Arts Co-op and Lincoln Acres, the actualization problem was not so much in overcoming barriers as presented in the values and attitudes of the teachers, but, paradoxically, that the values were internalized to such a high degree that compromise became impossible even when it was needed to preserve the innovations.

At Appelbaum, the original planner had hoped for a collegial organization, but the new principal opted for traditional bureaucracy. In that sense, little resocialization was ever required; teachers could operate traditionally.

It is hard to assess just how "collegial" the principals at Westgate ever wanted their schools to be. Perhaps they did expect that collegial relations should at least characterize the teams, if not the faculty as a whole. In any case, the socialization efforts were initially very weak, and Westgate teachers, many of whom seemed largely resigned to living in a bureaucratic organization, experienced a great deal of stress, since the role performances they were being thrust into were new, overloading, and to some degree, threatening. The most interesting thing about the Westgate experience is that the informal organization of the school, unlike those in other sites, began evolving in a more collegial direction, especially in School 2. We infer in this case that though coordinative roles were absent, the protection the principals provided from environmental pressure, combined with the implicit pressure for "teaming" the open space provided, enabled a sort of self-socialization by teachers as they struggled with implementation. We should also note that the general structure of both Westgate schools was decidedly bureaucratic, predictable, and in that sense provided a stable backdrop.

In sum, we can see from Lincoln Acres and Arts Co-op that poor organizational design and over-socialization make a collegial organization vulnerable, at the least, and perhaps serve as a force toward bureaucratization. But there is an additional variable: environmental inputs.

5. Environment. Contact with the environment creates pressures toward bureaucratic forms in various ways. In the case of College High School, union regulations, funding problems, site location problems and the generally high degree of uncertainty existing in the city reshaped the vision (and its abortive implementation effort) in the direction of traditional schooling. Arts Co-op experienced implementation problems as a result of the administrative requirements of the regional agency

(the new agency director used this weapon to assert his power and attack the "non-bureaucratic" aspects of the school). Appelbaum similarly had to cope with myriad regulations imposed from external sources. One of the major strains toward bureaucracy in the environment, then, is the fact that the new school has to fit in with the other bureaucracies in that environment (see Wayland, 1964). Often the other organizations serve a regulatory function and thus seek active control over various aspects of all schools in their jurisdiction. An innovative school requires special treatment; large public bureaucracies often resist variation in the units they administer because uniformity is easier to service.

Lincoln Acres and Westgate illustrate another element in the environment that pushes schools in the direction of bureaucracy: parents. In Westgate, concern with possible negative reaction to the proposed innovations by parents discouraged the administration from pressing for (or supporting) substantially new forms of classroom arrangements. The strategy was to avoid upsetting the harmonious relationships with parents by not risking substantial departures from the previously acceptable.

In Lincoln Acres, demands from the community for changes were met with administrative and faculty resistance which eventually led to conflict with the community, accompanied by deterioration of leadership, dissension among the faculty and movement from a collegial to a bureaucratic organization.

In general, the environment exerts a conservative influence on innovative schools, particularly as it tends to mold the new organism to fit with the varied groups and organizations in it. As mentioned above, boundary-spanning roles were not systematically considered or used by the schools and thus the ability to exercise control over various external groups was weakened.

In general, then, we propose that weak or missing organizational design, plus inappropriate socialization, plus environmental pressure all lead would-be collegial organizations toward bureaucratic forms. If any of these factors is reduced in strength (self-socialization as in Westgate); buffering from the environment (as in both Arts Co-op and Westgate); or (in principle) better design, then the collegial form should be more viable.

We should comment in passing that collegial forms, though they may be more congruent with what "professionals" want from an organization, and with "humane" treatment of children, are not necessarily highly competent when (a) centralization of power and decisive action is required; (b) when internal conflict is sharp; (c) when some members of the organization are ineffective and can endanger organizational accomplishment. In all these cases, collegial forms encounter difficulty; Lincoln Acres is perhaps the prime example.[11]

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11) We might wryly note that the SA project itself began as a collegial organization, but shifted more and more toward a centralized (though not bureaucratized) direction as the end of the project approached and the demands of final report production became pre-eminent.

Institutionalization[12]

Our final primary task, like the first, is a steadying one:

> The actualized school needs to be stabilized, routinized in a way that enables continued achievement of the original core goals (or, at the minimum, those goals that have survived the exigencies of the P/I process to date)... ensuring /the school's/ continued health and viability--and its real connection to its goals.

People in all of our sites spoke of "settling", "working better", things going "more smoothly"; it was clear that institutionalization was proceeding. It was not always clear just how or why this occurred: as the Westgate case noted:

> the institutionalization process itself seemed vague, only partially visible, and indeed somewhat miraculous at times to field workers.

However, there appear to be at least four different sources for institutionalization: the original vision, the available skills and experience of role occupants, rule orientation, and conflict. We discuss these below, and also add some reflections on the central role of leaders in institutionalization, and the issue of "self-renewal".

Vision. It seemed quite clear that the coherently-worked out vision for Arts Coop aided institutionalization strongly: though implementers were not planners as at Lincoln Acres, the idea of the school was so clear, and so much owned by the director (and to a reasonable degree by the staff he hired) that things became routinized quite rapidly. An interesting feature of Arts Coop's institutionalization was that it was relatively flexible and non-rigid on most counts: the basic ideology underlying the school, as an arts program, stressed flexibility and responsiveness to idiosyncratic circumstances.

By contrast, the unclear vision in Westgate made for much early institutionalization difficulty. The vision at Lincoln Acres was much clearer. Institutionalization difficulties there can be laid to the fact that the school was not buffered and protected from internal pressure (as at Arts Coop and Westgate).

Skills. A second answer to the question of what promotes stabilization is that offered in the Westgate case:

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12) By Matthew B. Miles.

> The fact that these were by and large experienced teachers meant that they had an array of coping skills, a repertoire of interventions they could draw on--even in the stresses of an unfamiliar setting. So much of the institutionalization process proceeded in shorthand, so to speak: teachers could assemble, and easily display to each other, a somewhat new set of mutual role expectations, drawing on a reasonably common language.

Given the newness to the Westgate teachers of much that they were attempting, this explanation is congruent with two other observations: (1) that there were a series of successive stabilizations over time, rather than a rapid routinization as at Arts Coop, (2) that serious institutionalization did not occur until there appeared a well-developed set of support relationships, both within implementing teams, and across the school as a whole. The Westgate case shows conclusively how important such support is. It could be argued, indeed, that it would be a mistake to conceive of institutionalization as a matter of routinized procedures, ways of doing things. It must also consist of reliable, predictable, and (ideally) benevolent relationships.

Rule orientation. At Lincoln Acres, and most especially at Appelbaum, we saw a strong focus on the development of clear, specified rules --formalized descriptions of appropriate and inappropriate behavior. At Lincoln Acres this appeared first in relation to the behavior of children, then later during the first year as the strained relationships between the principal and the staff were controlled by resort to formal agreements. Appelbaum was the quintessentially rule-oriented system, with the application of existing (and new) rules seen as the primary mode for insuring system stability. Strong rule orientation was in part generated by early system stress (the temporary quarters, etc), problems of student control and poor working conditions--but in part seemed to be a familiar means of increasing predictability, one which teachers and principal alike could easily utilize.

Conflict. In several cases, it was quite clear tha conflict, either between director and staff, or between school and community, served to stabilize and solidify the social system of the school. The hostility between Ellis Brown and the grievance-posing teachers at Lincoln Acres; the non-responsiveness of Harold Lassiter to the teachers' dissatisfactions at Appelbaum; the confrontation between David Steinhoff and the faculty enraged at his firing of Carole; and the dramatic confrontation between the critical parent and Ed Pallacino's supporters at School No. 2 in Westgate all showed that parts of the social system were at odds with each other. The result was a stabilized, formalized means of controlling and managing the conflict. In this view conflict does not tear, but knits up the social fabric.

Leaders' roles. In nearly all of our schools the principal or director became (or was already, as in Westgate No. 3) very central as implementation and institutionalization proceeded. Appelbaum's Harold Lassiter exerted more and more influence; Arts Coop's David Steinhoff became more and more isolated and decision-responsible; Lincoln Acres' Ellis Brown more and more abrogated the collegial plan the teachers and he had supposedly opted for. Westgate 3's George Reiger maintained steady centrality from the beginning. Only Westgate 2's Ed Pallacino seemed to be less central, allowing for the development of a strong collegial support system--but even he claimed to have been "responsible" for setting it up--"I was behind it all." And though Brown's successor Alberta Bard encouraged collegial decision-making in the second year at Lincoln Acres, it was clear that her presence was an immensely calming and stabilizing force. Table 3 compares these six leaders. It shows that the centrality of these six leaders did not stem from a comparable style. Table 3 outlines their difference on major dimensions: task emphasis, socio-emotional support, pro-activeness, collaborativeness, and predictability, and gives our ratings of institutionalization as well.

Table 3

LEADER STYLES AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION

	Task emphasis	Socio-emotional support	Pro-activeness	Collaborativeness	Predictability	Institutionalization
Westgate 2 (Ed Pallacino)	H	H	L	M	H	M+
Westgate 3 (George Rieger)	H	L	H	L	M	M
Lincoln Acres (Ellis Brown)	H	L	L	L	L	L
Lincoln Acres (Alberta Bard)	H	H	H	H	H	H
Appelbaum (Harold Lassiter)	H	L	H	L	H	H
Arts Coop (David Steinhoff)	H	L	H	M	M	H

We see from this array some interesting things: first, the radical style differences between Brown and Bard may help to explain why she was so successful in stabilizing Lincoln Acres. Second, task emphasis does not at all discriminate sites: it looks very much as if issues such as the personal predictability of the leader's operations (is s/he steady, reliable, firm, as contrasted with sudden, mercurial, impulsive) are more likely to be

associated with effective institutionalization.

Third, note that these five dimensions, taken together, help us to describe more clearly just what "rule-oriented" leadership looks like (strong, pro-active, predictable, non-supportive, non-collaborative behavior). And it's also clear that the over-all configuration is important in understanding apparent paradoxes: why did low-active Ed Pallacino do a more-effective job of institutionalizing than high-active George Rieger? The answer seems to lie in support and predictability--and possibly in collaborativeness.

Finally, the table shows us in a different way the probable importance of the Arts Co-op vision and its coherence: though Steinhoff gave little support, and was only moderately predictable and collaborative, he nevertheless achieved rapid and enduring institutionalization congruent with the original vision.

Renewal. Finally, we simply note in passing that the question of self-renewing capability as a part of institutionalization, a concept which makes abstract sense, never surfaced very clearly in these sites. The Westgate principals avoided the use of data from our surveys which could have been used for stocktaking purposes; Appelbaum's Lassiter did not proceed with consultant Bishop who could have aided with a second-year replanning: Alberta Bard was gradually and slowing moving Lincoln Acres back toward the original vision, but the mechanisms for doing so were not very clear. Only at Arts Coop did Steinhoff re-use our survey questionnaires for his own purposes, and employ consultant Kirk for thorough interviewing of staff and organizational diagnosis. Perhaps the "self-renewing" idea only begins to become salient after things get so institutionalized (and disliked) that the need for change is sharply perceived.

P/I Group Capabilities

Finally, what can be said in retrospect about the capabilities of planning/implementation groups? What seems to be crucial if the primary tasks we have been discussing are to be approached well, or at least well enough to promote a reasonable degree of implementation success?

Chapter 3 identifies six domains of skilled performance for groups involved in planning and implementation of new schools: legitimacy development; the political skills needed for obtaining environmental endorsement and resources; investment (ownership) development; meta-planning (creation of a plan for planning); decision-making; and reflexiveness (collection and use of data to improve operations).

Table 4 retrieves from the case studies our assessment of how well these six capabilities were carried out during both planning and implementation periods.

Table 4

P/I GROUP CAPABILITIES DURING PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION

		Legitimacy development	Political skills	Investment development	Meta-planning	Decision-making	Reflexiveness
Westgate	Planning	H	H	M	H/M*	M+	L
	Implementation	H	H	L	L	M	L
Lincoln Acres	Planning	M/L**	L	H	M	M	L
	Early Imp.(4mos)	L	L	L	L	L	L
	Later Imp.(1yr+)	H	H	H	M+	H	M+?
College High	Planning	L	L	L	L	L	L
Appelbaum	Planning	M+	H	H	L	M	?
	Implementation	H	H	L	M	M	?
Arts Co-op	Planning	H	H	H	H	H	H
	Implementation	M/L***	M/L***	M	M	M	H/M****

H = High M = Moderate L = Low

*Reduced during later planning.
**Moderate early, reduced during final planning.
***Moderate for school districts, low for parent agency.
****High in data collection, moderate in use for action.

It does seem that striking weakness in these capabilities (as in the across-the-board low ratings for Lincoln Acres' early implementation and the College High planning) is predictive of serious problems. It is no surprise that College High aborted, and that Lincoln Acres suffered heavy conflict (externally and internally) and lost much of its initial vision. Actors on these scenes could argue (as they did) that external events were too constraining and debilitating for even miracle workers to have coped, but as the College High case notes:

> The reality seemed to be that the group had insufficient capability to cope with its turbulent environment.... We are not prepared to conclude...that no one could have mustered the needed capabilities, given the lack of support from the top...the actions and participation of the planners cannot be discounted in explaining consequences.

Turning to the various columns of Table 4, we can also note, perhaps tautologically, that externally-oriented capabilities (legitimacy development and political skills) are perhaps critical: all sites with low performance on these had great difficulty. Added to Lincoln Acres and College High, we note Arts Co-op, which became extremely vulnerable to the power struggle with the head of its parent agency when the school's director was unable to marshal legitimacy, and had insufficient political skill to marshal external support groups and win the battle. The College High planners' inability to exploit the limited legitimacy they had been granted, along with their ineffective "personal politics" style, placed them in their uncomfortable position of not having the right to stop planning. They claimed environmental uncertainty as a prime explanation of their problems. But note that Appelbaum's planner and implementer, with legitimacy and more political skill, functioned quite productively in the same uncertain environment--Lakeport under fiscal crisis.

Table 4 also shows that most sites showed less capability in developing/maintaining investment once implementation got under way; the only exception is the Lincoln Acres setting, where Alberta Bard was concentrating on rebuilding an alienated and demoralized faculty. Perhaps it is easy to slip into the assumption that investment of faculty is less crucial after things start becoming institutionalized. Appelbaum's rule-oriented movement toward central control by Harold Lassiter, ignoring faculty wishes for the participation that could have increased investment, is probably connected with the fact that most teachers fell back on traditional teaching methods.

It seems possible too that meta-planning capability falls back once the school starts up. Again, Lincoln Acres is an exception, probably for the same reason noted above. And the sketchy meta-plan operated by Ann Woodward for the planning stages of Appelbaum was of necessity replaced by a crisper outline of milestones when the new school had to open in temporary facilities would double in size the second year, and so on.

The extreme case of poor meta-planning comes, once again, from College High:

> The committee had a rough "plan for planning" when they began. But when unanticipated events began to occur, they did not revise or re-think this over-all plan in any systematic fashion.... The very powerlessness, uncertainty, conflicting institutional stakes and poor meetings management which made planning difficult, seemed to make meta-planning even more so. What the group lacked most was perspective, the ability to back off, confront the absurdity of what they were doing, and get their corporate life under more control.

It is not clear from our cases whether good meta-planning is as crucial as the externally-oriented capabilities, but we suspect it runs a strong second.

What about decision-making skill? It too seems typically more present during planning than in implementation (again except for Lincoln Acres): it may be that planning decisions are simply more visible, of course, but we suspect that the entrance of large numbers of new actors and the exigencies of organizational actualization reduce decision quality and ownership. To put it another way, the demands for decision-making skill in the opened school are, if anything, higher than during planning.

The movement toward more centralized decision-making, which we have already noted occurred in a number of our sites, placed a good deal of pressure on the shrewdness and wisdom of principals. Unfortunately, kings are not always philosophers, and so principals like Harold Lassiter, who made most decisions himself with limited consultation, probably sapped faculty morale, along with ownership of those decisions. But many were technically satisfactory, as well as being conservative in flavor, so a faculty largely uncommitted to innovation could accept them.

It is quite clear that reflexivity may not be as critical a capability as we expected. New schools can get by reasonably well without thorough-going, systematic means of collecting data and using it to steer decisions. Westgate's low reflexivity, whether it was merely shallow, or based on stout refusal to use available survey data ("it would be like going into a patch of poison ivy and looking under each leaf") did not hamper what eventually became a moderate implementation. Arts Co-op, the site which collected and looked at massive amounts of data, from student logs to surveys to consultant interviews to questionnaires, sometimes seemed weak in problem-solving efforts based on it. That weakness came in part from the director's super-criticalness, but perhaps as much because of his concentration on

> the actions of individuals, rather than the whole system... David was always in touch with the immediate concerns, but was shocked when the conflict with the staff blew up in June, because he had been unaware of their frustration and anger..../the school/ was highly reflexive about the immediate problems and concerns of the program, but was less reflexive about organization-level issues.

Still, the data provided by the staff's confrontation meeting with the director did get through, and were used in redesigning the program for the second year. Perhaps the issue is not so much the amount of data collected, but its salience and compellingness, and its connectability to organizational-level issues.

One final point might be made about P/I group capabilities. That they do not predict implementation success--though their decisive absence is associated with failure--comes from the fact that like all

skills they are substantively neutral. They can be used either to support the implementation of a vision, or (in effect) to stall or block it, depending on what goals planners and implementers are in fact committed to.

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Chapter 11

IMPLICATIONS AND ADVICE

Matthew B. Miles

The late comedian Lenny Bruce had a routine that went like this:

> Now here's something I'd like to read you. It's A Guide for Swimmers in Shark-Infested Waters, by a doctor at the University of Miami.
>
> The first point he makes is, "Get out of the water as quickly as possible."
>
> [*sotto voce*] Thanks a lot, Doctor. I hadn't thought of that.

Concluding sections of this sort are extremely susceptible to similar advice-offerings, and can easily evoke similar reactions. After four and a half years of work and 1600-odd pages of writing, efforts to adduce "lessons" or "suggestions" for others are likely to be abstract, trite or both, and perhaps obscure. Still, we have the audacity to reflect here briefly on some possible lessons that may be useful for several different audiences: those planning and implementing new schools; those supplying funds for such efforts; those aiding or facilitating such efforts; and students and researchers of the educational change process. We will be brisk, trusting the reader to dip back into earlier sections of this report if s/he is dubious about what is being offered.

For Planners and Implementers

1. It's more complex than you think. The exigencies of planning and implementation present a formidable tangle of interconnected activities, if taken at all seriously. Stress is typical. Failures of some degree are inevitable.

2. Rationality is possible. While no one who has watched or done new-school planning would ever argue that things are (or should be) done in a step-by-step, tightly rational manner--the reality, as we have suggested, is something like a mosaic construction process--it appears that planners can profit from using their minds, most notably by constructing and continuously monitoring their location in, and progress through a general meta-plan.

3. Politics are crucial. "Political" issues are sometimes contrasted with the "rational" and "technical" aspects of enterprises of this sort. That is a fatal mistake. It is very important to be thoughtful/rational, and decidedly pro-active, about strategies for gaining resources and endorsement from the environment, and for protecting the new school from undesirable environmental pressure. Otherwise the very ground the new school rests on will be shaky.

4. Realizing dreams is the hard part. Judging from our research, most people in schools know how to produce a school that will function reasonably well. It is much more difficult to produce a school that is a good working model of the vision its planners held in the first place. One can always fall back to conventionality (and that, perhaps, is reassuring). But retaining the dream, building a system design that will genuinely realize it, and bringing it into stable being take much energy. It can be done.

5. Avoid "default" social architecture: do it explicitly. The primal link between vision and operating school is the social design produced by planners and early implementers. Unawareness of the importance of this statement (and the complexity it conceals) can easily lead to a "default" mode: planners drift into an organization with largely familiar features that no one really wants. Careful and thorough social designing leads to schools much nearer to one's original vision.

6. Use technical assistance. Most planners and implementers know a good deal about operating, but much less about creating new schools. It is decidedly to their advantage to use supportive materials like those we have developed (Mapping New Schools: Part V of this Report), just as it is to involve consulting support from the very beginning. Reluctance and ambivalence about seeking help are natural, but are worth the effort it takes to transcend them.

7. It's impossible without protection and support. New schools, certainly during their planning, but most centrally during the first year (at least) of implementation require painstaking protection from environmental pressures that might jeopardize their development (Note: this does not mean withdrawal into isolation, but creating active mechanisms that buffer external pressures, enable productive school environment linkage and permit problem-solving). Secondly, the people working in new schools need large amounts of direct support, including training, consultation, hand-holding, and the development of reliable, trusting colleague relationships. Minimizing such support will guarantee frustration, failure, and business as usual. That is a flat statement, with much evidence behind it.

Funding Agencies

1. Extra resources are needed. The planning and implementation functions outlined above represent a more-than-incremental addition to regular funding. At the local district level, funds for up to a year's final

social-architectural planning should be allocated, with a principal arriving eight to ten months prior to opening. Funds for staff planning, pre-opening training, and continued consultation need to be provided--well over usual allocations for in-service training.

2. The new-school strategy is in principle workable. State and federal agencies interested in the exemplification of new educational practices can reasonably expect to accomplish that aim if adequate resources, and adequate lead time are provided. But new schools are especially vulnerable to abandonment of the very innovative hopes for which they were created, and need careful planning, add-on funds, protection, and technical assistance if they are to actualize their intentions. Funds should also be allocated explicitly for the demonstration-diffusion function of such schools, which is typically left undesigned.

3. Qualitative research methods remain plausible, but expensive and mysterious. The creation of new schools, and educational change more generally, can surely be illuminated by the sort of ethnographic work we have reported, especially in its emphasis on the flow of events in a complex, changing setting. But such methods are very costly per unit of knowledge gained, and the conclusions are drawn by half-known, arcane, probably intuitive means. Funds should be allocated for (a) a "state of the art" examination of qualitative methodology with strong emphasis on coding and analysis methods, and (b) a series of methodological studies (e.g., the utility of alternative coding, storage and retrieval schemes; the replicability of case production; the sorts of qualitative products most useful to various research and policy-making audiences).

Consultants and Facilitators

1. Expect entry difficulty. Earning the right to help the creators of a new school, or any new system, is fraught with problems: the insecurity and vulnerability of the enterprise, its members' needs for self-reliance and system-building, their serious unawareness of the complexity of what they are embarking on. Forming a helping relationship with a new school's planners is more difficult than with established systems, afflicted with specific hurts or problems.

2. Start early. Defining facilitative help as part of the evolving planning/implementation system from the beginning will make it more likely that assistance (and other external expertise) will be used throughout the planning.

3. Use materials. Since part of the "client" problem is unawareness of needed skills, and inadequate mapping of the planning/implementation process, materials such as those developed by the Social Architecture project (Mapping New Schools, Part V of this Report) can not only aid with entry, but with the learning experiences that need to occur in tandem with "operating" the P/I effort.

Researchers and Students of Educational Change

1. New-school processes are different--but how? It is clear that many generalizations from the educational change literature apply to the case of the new-school strategy (e.g., the importance of support, and the development of investment through participation). But it is also clear that some processes, such as meta-planning, are less frequently visible when innovation is undertaken within established systems. We need much more clarity on such matters.

2. Counter-theoretical events need explaining. As the Westgate case demonstrates richly, received doctrine about educational change can be decidedly inapplicable in situations where a reasonably good implementation is achieved. And there were many, many points in the Lincoln Acres case where surprising, unpredicted, almost capricious events occurred. We commend to the interested reader the exercise of proceeding through any of our cases, stopping at each analysis point to make predictions about next steps. Our prediction is that readers' batting averages will be at least as poor as ours were while the cases were unfolding. (Our coherent, after-the-fact analyses are something else.) But poor predictions are usually fruitful in encouraging the development of alternate explanations.

3. Field work needs concepts. We began early with a bank of ideas, not yet evolved into a conceptual framework. If anything, we would advise faster attention to conceptualization. Sieber has suggested the use of a "pure model," a naive view (e.g., that planning is a fully rational process) which is deliberately espoused early so that departures from it can be detected and understood in the service of revising the model. We have already suggested that the supposedly blinding and biasing characteristics of early frameworks are far less serious than the problem of becoming overwhelmed with meaningless data.

4. Obsess less. A crisper theoretical frame also helps to ward off the desperate need to code everything in retrievable form. With such a frame, it is more possible to select, to say more quickly what is "dross," and to feel easy about not categorizing all material that emerges from the field worker's tape recorder.

5. Analyze from the start. The early production of qualitative data analyses (updates, summaries, site reports, trial runs with coding schemes, etc.) is highly to be desired, both to clarify and deepen analysis modes themselves and make them more reliable, and to revise and extend the conceptual framework.

6. Exploit the qualitative/quantitative mix. The value of having both sorts of information in this study was large, even though we underused the quantitative data bank considerably. The value of testing/disproving conclusions by playing one set of data against another is substantial, as we saw in the Westgate and Appelbaum case analyses.

7. Organize more crisply. The Social Architecture Project's social architecture left something to be desired: it was collegially oriented without quite full colleague participation, as a senior researcher tried to create collaboration with junior and part-time associates. Others trying this brand of field research are advised either to try it more hierarchically, with clear divisions of labor--or to start from the beginning with experienced colleagues, who have been through similar mills before and know what to expect and when and how it will have to be delivered.

8. Include a dissemination component. As we have already indicated, having a colleague with central responsibility for turning one's inquiry outward into immediately-useful products is a remarkable aid to conceptualization and clarity. Research of this sort is typically hampered if the researchers themselves worry too much about how it will help the world while they are struggling with the inquiry. But a developer, pursuing the product-oriented task, with user audiences in mind, can lean from time to time on researchers to be more explicit and user-oriented, and that can help both research and dissemination.

9. Onward with new-systems research. This project focused on new schools as an educational improvement strategy, and has pushed back the curtains of ignorance somewhat. But of course there is still a good deal unknown; our conclusions feel more like plausible hypotheses than Laws of Social Architecture (if indeed such there be). More generally, the growing and largely prescriptive literature in organizational design has not been accompanied by empirical literature showing just what happens, and how, when an organization is designed, started up, and stabilized. We hope our effort encourages many more like it, in and out of education.

10. Get out of the water as quickly as possible.

Thank you, Doctor.